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ABSTRACT
Th e methods of intellectual history have not yet been applied to study-
ing the invention of technology for printing texts and images ca. 1375–ca. 
1450. One of the several conceptual developments in this period refl ect-
ing the possibility of mechanical replication is a view of the relationship of 
eternity to durational time based on Gregory of Nyssa’s philosophy of time 
and William of Ockham’s. Th e article considers how changes in these ideas 
helped enable the conceptual possibilities of the dissemination of ideas. It 
describes a direct connection of human perceptual knowledge to divine 
knowledge that enhanced the authority of printed production to transfer 
and reproduce the true and the good.
KEYWORDS
history of technology, mechanical reproduction, nominalism, philosophy 
of time, printing, relics
Against ideas’ old reputation for populating the realm of the permanent and 
infi nite, we now see them as drivers of ceaselessly changing relationships. 
Whether through text, data, or images, our conceptual thinking about life 
and existence motivates our actions and shapes our production. Th is realiza-
tion is a principal instigator of the history of ideas and other historiographic 
endeavors. Until less than a half-century ago, the practice of printing—in-
cluding typography, engraving, and woodcuts—launched more information 
and ideas into circulation than anything else in human history, continually 
increasing the speed toward more complicated conceptions and actions.
Th is accelerating eff ect of print is one of the chief markers of modernity, 
from the initial deployment of replicative technologies ca. 1375–ca. 1450 on-
ward. And yet this dynamo of change, print, and especially typography—a 
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new industrial complex—is portrayed as having arisen rather abruptly and 
then rapidly spreading, with little constraint and with no evident conceptual 
foundation, from the previous phase of European culture in which change 
and history itself were conceptualized chiefl y in connection with eter-
nity and in which the domain of the eternal was held to order the cosmos. 
Coming-to-be and passing-away have been well understood by all peoples 
simply from the experiences of natural existence. But for the Christian peo-
ples of Eurasia in the Middle Ages, change was, broadly speaking, profoundly 
conciliated by eternity. Starting at least as early as the infl uence of St. Augus-
tine, the eternal served to reconcile the people in these societies to losses; 
the fi nal pain of change was, so to speak, sealed away by the eschaton. Th e 
rapid movement of ideas, information, and images helped to change that.
Th us, the idea of print can be contrasted with the idea of eternity as or-
ders of things. In Europe, the era of print and its technology, in contrast 
with the era of dominant belief in the idea of eternity and the practice of that 
belief, the “age of print” follows directly upon what may be called, for sym-
metry’s sake but a little awkwardly, the “age of eternity.” While the advent of 
printing is intensely studied as the history of technology and as socio-cul-
tural history, it is not studied from the point of view of intellectual history, 
with a couple of thin exceptions.1 What concepts allowed for the mechanical 
multiplication of text and image, and what ideas motivated people to cre-
ate these techniques? I suggest we approach this question of “pre-print” by 
observing the successive and branching ideas in late Scholasticism that con-
stellated in the invention and deployment of replicative technologies. What 
gave the readers of text and image mechanically replicated in multiples the 
confi dence and trust they had put into the originals and their copying by the 
hands of artists? And in what did they come to have confi dence? I argue that 
the answers are not only the faithfulness of the reproduction but also the 
1. Choosing a few examples from among many, one fi nds no discussion of a conceptual 
history approach in the standard accounts, for example, David McKitterick, “Th e Be-
ginning of Printing,” in Th e New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 7 c. 1415–c. 1500, ed. 
Christopher Allmand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 287–298; or in 
the most recent major specialized work, Eric Marshall White, Editio Princeps: A History 
of the Gutenberg Bible (London: Harvey Miller, 2017), 21–48; or in work on Gutenberg’s 
world, such as Wolfgang Dobras, ed., Gutenberg, Man of the Millennium: From a Secret 
Enterprise to the First Media Revolution (Mainz: City of Mainz, 2000); or in works on 
Gutenberg’s life; in works on the history of this technology and related socio-cultural 
history; in work on early printmaking, such as Peter Parshall, Rainer Schoch, David 
Areford, Richard S. Field, and Peter Schmidt, eds., Origins of European Printmaking: 
Fift eenth-Century Woodcuts and Th eir Public (Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art, 
2005). Th e most sensitive and advanced article on this is from an art-historical perspec-
tive: Elina Gertsman, “Multiple Impressions: Christ in the Winepress and the Semiotics of 
the Printed Image,” Art History 36, no. 2 (2014): 310–337, doi:10.1111/1467-8365.12000.
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transference of truth and goodness from the authority of truth and good-
ness in the original to the copy. In pursuing this avenue of inquiry, I will not 
include matters relating to the history of reading, the manuscript tradition, 
technology, or other cultural developments—not because they are not part 
of the story, for they did share skills and persons with print, but because I 
want to focus attention on development of certain relevant concepts.
One of the theoretical reasons for pursuing this is to show that intel-
lectual history creates valid history, fi rst by describing strongly generative 
tensions, and second by discovering consequential relationships not due to 
such direct routes as contemporaneity, personal infl uence, or specifi c liter-
ary contact. To the extent that our wide and pluriform ways of learning are 
structured, the structuration is oft en at levels too deep for conscious con-
trol by rationalist pattern-making and goes, instead, in untamed zigzags and 
leaps. If we are open to these ways, we will avoid the eff ect of some of our own 
unobserved desires to impose order on the past, and some of our conscious 
eff orts as well—though, of course, the approach I advocate can make for dif-
ferent instances of the same errors. Another benefi t of this inquiry is that it 
looks straight into the heart of the way concepts of temporality led to ideas 
about history around which modernity eventually formed. Th is is beyond the 
scope of this article, but here I can lay a prologue to investigating how the 
story of the historical discourse about medieval thought and about printing 
technology shows us that these topics were used to help form the concepts of 
time, history, society, and politics at every stage since the Renaissance.
An inquiry into the histories of ideas of an eternal order and an indefi -
nitely, and now infi nitely, representable and mutable order can help us pen-
etrate the closed-off  darkness in which the origins of print lies. While a few 
more fragments of pre-print or some bits of early typographic technology 
are occasionally found, we are confi ned on the whole to material evidence of 
what has been preserved to date, although it is being more deeply plumbed 
by imaging and other technologies. But almost all of the abundant philoso-
phy of the late Middle Ages is preserved and can serve an intellectual history 
inquiry into the conceptual preconditions of pre-print.
Putting part of the origin of the age of printed communication into con-
cepts of eternity means that print—the impress of the original of text, image, 
and data into copies by a technology that ultimately created a system of stor-
age, diff usion, and retrieval—at its start involved, on the part of the person 
or persons who invented the craft  and on the part of those who developed 
and used it, not only verifi cation of the truth of the copy but also referred 
transferred moral authority from its supernatural source to the world of ac-
cumulated human knowledge.
Th e Christian theology of eternity begins with St. Augustine (354–430 
CE) in the fourth century and also with what I will show to be an import-
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ant conceptualization by his contemporary Gregory of Nyssa (335–394 CE). 
So here we must place our footings at ca. 400 and ca. 1400, a millennium 
apart. To make yet more trouble, one of the most important thinkers in this 
fi eld whose ideas are relevant here lived in the ninth century, exactly halfway 
between the other dates. Th is is John Scotus Eriugena (815–877 CE). One 
could start earlier than Augustine, and one could add texts by many others 
who wrote through this medieval millennium, such as Boethius (whose con-
cept of eternity is based on issues diff erent from those the neo-Platonists 
focused on) and numerous theologians from Albertus Magnus through the 
early fi ft eenth century; but the case here is that these three theologians—
Augustine, Nyssa, and Eriugena—provide the structure we need from the 
earlier Middle Ages, before the twelft h century “renaissance” and before 
Scholasticism, to set up ideas that contrast with and can also lead to the con-
ceptions of various topics that enabled replicative technologies.2 Finally, the 
ideas William of Ockham (1285–1347 CE) about eternity suggest one of the 
conceptual possibilities to which this development led that ought to be part 
of our understanding of the invention of printing. Th ese four footings across 
a millennium stretch, tensely, the historiographic narrative of the inception 
of print as a multiplication of what is true and good back to its most reason-
able proximate conceptual origin.
St. Augustine’s view of eternity in his Confessions is part of a presentist 
philosophy of time. We cannot locate past and future moments except in 
present thinking activity.3 All time, he says, is present time, and all present 
time is instantaneously fl eeting moments.4 “Past” and “future” are merely 
ways of speaking of the present as prompted by memory and expectation.5 
Th e cosmos comprises the fi rst Heaven and earth made by God “outside 
time” but other than His own substance; and the second Heaven and earth, 
including humankind with the rest of created nature, which exist in the fl eet-
ing present that is the whole of time.6 Th e only temporality that can exist is 
therefore a part of divine timelessness. He knows transience, and so tran-
sience exists within His eternality.7 For humans, memory is where eternity 
2. For some of the other sides of the medieval discussion of eternity, see Peter Adam-
son, “Eternity in Medieval Philosophy,” in Eternity: A History, ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 76–115; and Carlos Steel, “Th e Neoplatonic 
Doctrine of Time and Eternity and Its Infl uence on Medieval Philosophy,” in Th e Medi-
eval Concept of Time: Studies on the Scholastic Dispute and Its Reception in Early Modern 
Philosophy, ed. Pasquale Porro (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 3–32.
3. Augustine, Confessions, 11.18.23–24.
4. Ibid., 11.18.23–24, 11.15.20–21.
5. Ibid., 11.18.26.
6. Ibid., 12.12.15.
7. Ibid., 12.15.18.
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“dwells,” because it holds all things in a never-ending present, as if they were 
timeless.8 Time can be change alone and change solely at its fastest, as in-
stantaneity so intense that it does not exist. It, and all things mutable, exists 
only because God holds it within Himself.9 Th e energy we feel from the pas-
sage of time is the impetus of the divine creation and guidance.10 Since time, 
being nothing but transience, cannot exist on its own, the whole of it must 
be located where nothing is lost, that is, in eternity.11 In this way, time and 
eternity are alike, as both are entirely made of the present and nothing but 
the present, except that in time all presence is the passing present, in which 
all is lost, while eternity is endless presence, without loss.12
Presentist philosophies of time in recent analytic metaphysics help 
show the consequences of Augustine’s position for conceptions of history 
and of the production of information as historical process.13 Contemporary 
analytic presentism faces off  against views holding that temporal relation-
ships permanently exist instead of being negated by the instantaneous pres-
ent. World War I always was and always will be before World War II, and 
29 July 1752 must always follow 28 July 1752. Before and aft er do not alter. 
(Th is is called “eternalism” in the sense of this word having nothing to do 
with the notions of eternity discussed here.) Th ese presentisms can be the-
istic or non-theistic, and they sometimes use a quantum of duration, such as 
“growing block” or “moving spotlight” or “specious present,” to ease tem-
poral relations into presentism. Whereas Augustinian presentism subsumes 
time under eternity, in most modern presentisms, the fl eeting present (or 
another kind of present) just is what reality is insofar as we characterize it by 
time. But both Augustinian and more recent presentisms require exclusion 
of real existence for anything not in the present. Under Augustine’s view, 
insofar as anything is real, it is or participates in the timeless present called 
eternity. Th is necessary presentness of all pasts causes great problems when 
we start to think about history rather than solely of time (diffi  culties of no 
concern to most philosophers of time), because presentism excludes the real 
existence of past and future whether it does or does not credit the eternity of 
8. Ibid., 10.25.36.
9. Ibid., 7.15.21.
10. Ibid., 4.8.13.
11. On some of theological diffi  culties in Augustine’s position, see Marilyn Ekdahl 
Ravicz, “St. Augustine: Time and Eternity,” Th e Th omist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 
22, no. 4 (1959): 542–554, doi:10.1353/tho.1959.0032.
12. Augustine, Confessions, 11.11.13.
13. As argued by, for example, Mark Hinchliff , “Th e Puzzle of Change,” Philosophical 
Perspectives 10 (1996): 119–136, doi:10.2307/2216239; and Ned Markosian, “A Defense 
of Presentism,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1, ed. Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 47–82.
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a divine being or realm. For Augustine’s special theological line of thought, 
this leaves memory while excluding all mutable things, but the eff ect on how 
people might understand their capacities to alter the conditions of their lives 
is in some ways the same as that of modern presentism if it were thought 
through as an understanding of history or of human behavior.14
Augustine developed his view of history in congruence with his view of 
time. Humans exist and act as part of God’s plan. Th e span of time from the 
Fall to the redemption of the world is made of fl eeting presents sustained 
by the divine purpose realized in the eschaton. Th e present time we share 
with God is the way we have awareness of our sin. Th e real existence of this 
span of presentist time is in God’s eternal existence as an always conscious, 
always knowing, always active creator. Th is does not recognize history in 
our sense of the word because God’s actions are in eternity and not in time; 
instead, this view subsumes history under eternity as delivered by the end 
of time.15 Th e starkness of human existence before God in Augustine led 
to non-historicality. Th is is why Augustine’s presentism does not allow 
for history except as comprehended in God. It limits its understanding of 
change—and of the dynamic of the diff usion of information—by preempt-
ing history.
St. Gregory of Nyssa’s intense analysis of eternality in his Adversus Eu-
nomium became, like Augustine’s, an authoritative conception of eternity 
in medieval Latin Christianity.16 But a fateful ambivalence as to the nature if 
eternity existed in the neo-Platonism both these Fathers shared from before 
its Christianization.17 Gregory’s view of the relation of time and eternity, also 
neo-Platonic in origin, diff ered from Augustine’s, resulting in a philosophy 
of time with widely diff erent implications.
14. Augustine’s presentism, of course, has moral implications quite distinct from those 
of modern analytic presentism. For a discussion of his presentism in his devotional con-
text, see Katherin A. Rogers, “St. Augustine on Time and Eternity,” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 72, no. 2 (Spring, 1996): 207–226.
15. Similarly argued by Johannes Van Oort, “Th e End is Now: Augustine on History 
and Eschatology,” HTS: Teologiese Studies/Th eological Studies 68, no. 1 (2012): 1–7. 
16. Werner Jaeger, ed. Contra Eunomium Libri (Leiden: Brill, 1960). I also used the 
sole English translation of the entire work in A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers . . . Second Series . . . Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises, etc., trans. Philip Schaff  
and Henry Wace (New York: Christian Literature Company, 1893); and the translation 
of book 2 by Stuart George Hall, as “Th e Second Book against Eunomius,” in Gregory of 
Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II . . . Proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory 
of Nyssa, ed. Lenka Karfi ková et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 59–204. Citations below refer 
to the traditional division into books plus Jaeger’s book and section numbers (added to 
Migne’s division of books and parts), as well as Jaeger’s pagination.
17. See Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory 
and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: Brill 1978), 72n212.
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Gregory’s target was the Arian claim that Jesus was begotten in time 
rather than existent in eternity.18 To defeat Eunomius’s claim of temporal 
duration (“begetting”) in the procession of the Holy Spirit and the Son from 
the Father, Gregory argues that if we are to purge materiality from our idea 
of a God who had no beginning, we must hold that eternity is temporal ex-
istence without temporal intervals or sequences.19 Nothing was before God 
or will be aft er God, else He would be discontinuous and would partake of 
nothing, which cannot exist.20 When we think of God we cannot cut him 
short at any point in time.21 Gregory thinks, however, that a further notion 
is required to grasp eternity, and he develops it in the following way: God is 
not merely endless nor merely “unbegotten”; He neither perdures nor en-
dures.22 For God is simple, not multiple. In order to limit the consequences 
of the schema of a creator’s unity and his creation’s plurality, Gregory’s eter-
nity must be time without interval (beginning, middle, or end). “Time” for 
God must be basically diff erent from what it is for us who are slow to under-
stand.23 Interval, quantity, and circumscription are not evidence supporting 
any denial of eternality.24 We cannot describe eternity by any of the marks by 
which we describe the temporal, and no marks of the temporal can negate 
eternity; but, since anything eternal exists unlimited by interval, it exists at 
all times. Th e result of this is to recognize that time is a domain of relation-
ships separate from the domain of eternity.
Th e issue of time and eternity is refl ected in a confl ict of the Genesis ac-
count of the creation with a neo-Platonic account that does not appear in 
Augustine but that does develop in the hands of other thinkers.25 In the “the-
ologized” Genesis account, God acts on everything in the instant of creating 
the universe. In Plotinus’s version of neo-Platonism, the godhead-like prin-
ciple it calls the One encompasses subordinate principles (or levels) of the 
created that it “emanates.” Plotinus fl attens the process of creation: as emana-
tion it is a strictly rational development of the ontologically dependent many 
out of the absolutely simple One and not at all a temporal process.26 Gregory 
18. Gregory’s brother, St. Basil of Cesarea (330–379 CE), also wrote an anti-Arian trea-
tise Contra Eunomium.
19. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, I.624–633 ( Jaeger 1.206–208) and 3.73–93 
( Jaeger, 2.31–35).
20. Ibid., III.3.8–11 ( Jaeger, 2.109–111).
21. Ibid., III.6.3–11 ( Jaeger, 2.186–189).
22. Ibid., II.192–195 ( Jaeger, 1. 280–281).
23. Ibid., III.6.23–26 ( Jaeger, 2.193–195).
24. Ibid., III.66–78 ( Jaeger, 3.209–213).
25. See Conrad Rudolph, Th e Mystic Ark: Hugh of Saint Victor, Art, and Th ought in the 
Twelft h Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 36–37.
26. Plotinus, Enneads, V.1.7.
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will stand for nothing of the sort. Th e creation in Genesis is a miracle rather 
than a rational event since God created reason as well as the heavens in the 
creation; the relationship of the divine creator to the created is in the end a 
mystery, not that of a rational administrator to levels of weaker power. In 
Gregory’s view, God acts with no emanations or intervals of any kind, nor 
is He less present in some corners of His creation than in others. Th us, the 
temporality of our world need not refl ect or express eternity. God’s power 
enables His creation of a real but non-eternal time.
God’s action is the creation of all things. Gregory holds that humans can 
understand these actions of God, although the being of God in timelessness 
is utterly unintelligible to fi nite minds.27 Th erefore, our human use of con-
cepts can track the divine in all creation. Limited though we are, we have 
faith, on the one hand, to reach over what divides us from God; and on the 
other hand, we have conceptual thought we can move upwards through in 
rational knowledge by way of nothing less than every thing in the universe 
and every event and process.28 Gregory uses this notion, on which he lays 
great stress and to which much of book two of Against Eunomius is devoted, 
for threading a very narrow needle. It is meant to compass the tensions of 
separation and inclusion in the relations of the created to the creator. It is 
meant, furthermore, to make devotion capacious but also to constrain it 
from violating the limits that a correct ontology lays down.
We can understand the importance of the diff erence between Gregory 
and Augustine by looking at the relation of the created world to the cre-
ator in the work of John Scot Eriugena.29 I focus here on Eriugena because, 
while the question of Eriugena’s infl uence is a diffi  cult one, he furthered the 
Greek tradition of philosophical speculation in the Latin world. Eriugena’s 
approach exposes the confl ict within the Latin view of divine eternality 
that grew out of the terms of the loose, highly generalized neo-Platonism 
that Augustine developed. Eriugena was a very likely conduit of pseudo-
Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa into later medieval theology.30
27. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, II.268–271 ( Jaeger, 1.304–305).
28. Ibid., II.253 ( Jaeger, 1.300).
29. Eriugena’s systematic work is Perisypheon liber quintus, ed. Edouard Jeauneau 
(CCCM 161–165) (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996–2007), translated as Perisypheon (Th e Di-
vision of Nature) by I. P. Sheldon-Williams and revised by John J. O’Meara (Washington, 
DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1987), cited here by the column and section numbers in Migne, 
Patrologia Latina, vol. 122 (1853), which are used in both Jeauneau and the English 
translation.
30. See the editor’s list of citations in the Sheldon-Wilmot/O’Meara translation, 718–
719; Dermot Moran, Th e Philosophy of John Scotus Eriugena: A Study of Idealism in the 
Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 53–54; and John O’Meara, 
Eriugena (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 76–79.
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Eriugena readily quotes Gregory of Nyssa at length, but his specifi c vi-
sion was moved away from Gregory’s by the pseudo-Dionysian works he 
read and translated. In his fourfold division of being, he joined the manifold 
universe (the fourth level) to the one creator God (the fi rst level) on the 
grounds that the end of all things—meaning both their purpose and their 
termination—is found in the beginning of all things.31 To his mind this was 
required by the neo-Platonic principles that everything is truly the One and 
that the self-constituted One alone can and does return everything emanat-
ing from it back into itself.32 Th us creator and creation are not names of en-
tities but rather words suggesting a relationship of self-identity that must 
obtain but can obtain only within the “simple unity” of the divine nature.33 
Th e “splendors of the saints” are a part of God.34 In a beautiful passage, Eri-
ugena turns Plotinian emanation into the indivisible fl ow of a river from its 
well,35 and his view of the creation is that of the multiplication of the One 
through the dyad.36 Th is serves him in justifying the Christian view of resur-
rection: death is the beginning of the return of nature to God.37
Eriugena casts the problem in terms of the return of all things to rea-
son.38 Gregory’s God required no intermediaries in order to create, but His 
creation was separate from Himself. A more rigid neo-Platonic theology 
such as Eriugena’s muddies the levels of dependence and independence of 
creation with regard to its creator: there is a movement between them, like 
a river, but their simple unity is equally strongly held.39 Th is is not to say 
that Gregory or anyone else solved the problem of participation, for his ac-
count is inconsistent, if not muddy. But it had this advantage, that a religion 
founded on divine incarnation and resurrection could not apply the simple 
unity of its godhead to all the universe, any more than it could submerge the 
problem of evil into the primitive unity of divine nature.40
31. Eriugena, Periphyseon, 526C–527C.
32. For Eriugena, all existence, including the human being, is essentially a concept in 
the mind of God (Periphyseon, 769B–C), and matter is actually a form of divine essence 
(Periphyseon, 633B), as Plotinus, Enneads, V.3.12.
33. Ibid., 527D–528A.
34. Ibid., 559B–560B.
35. Ibid., 632B–632D. 
36. Ibid., 652B.
37. Ibid., 875C–875D. On “self-reversion” as a major theme in neo-Platonism, see 
Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, 125–129 and 217–228. 
38. Ibid., 743C.
39. Christoph Erismann, “Th e Logic of Being: Eriugena’s Dialectical Ontology,” Vivar-
ium 45 (2007): 203–218, here 206–207, doi:10.1163/156853407X217722.
40. In Periphyseon 960A–966A, Eriugena struggles with situating the irrational or the 
real existence of evil in connection to the divine harmony of all things.
10 contributions to the history of concepts
Bennett Gilbert
As the Middle Ages advanced and Scholasticism started to form, the dif-
fering outcomes of the emanation, or neo-Platonic, view of the creation, as 
exemplifi ed in Eriugena, and of the miracle, or theologized Genesis, view of 
the creation, as exemplifi ed in Gregory of Nyssa, were consequential, even 
if the diff erence seems slight at its origin in retrospect. Augustine held the 
two in tension, but conceptual development put them into opposition. Th e 
method of philosophical and theological thought that Gregory of Nyssa’s 
concept of divine eternality tends to authorize is that of analogy, by which 
we understand things through a chain of intelligible similarities. Th e philo-
sophical and theological method that Eriugena’s view of divine nature tends 
to require is that of anagogy, by which we must use what we can compare 
in order to move understanding toward radical diff erence.41 In his study of 
twelft h century Latin speculative and theological poetry, Winthrop Wether-
bee has described two sides of the medieval way of seeing the divine pres-
ence in all things in this period. He describes the fi rst as “rational-scientifi c” 
and characterized by the use metaphor; it issues in the speculative power of 
analogy. Nyssa’s view of the created world as informed by the eternal pres-
ence of the divine supports the use of analogy as the method of thought. 
Th e second side of the medieval way of seeing divine presence he calls the 
“sapiential-intuitive” method, characterized by the use of symbolism; and it 
issues in anagogy.42 Eriugena’s view, and a great deal of apophatic theology 
straight to Cusa and aft er, centrally relies on anagogy, the validity of which 
may be said to be based on the view of God’s infi nitude and eternal presence 
outlined here.
On the one hand, Gregory held that God’s power of action is one with 
His being and that the created, which does not have the power of creating, is 
separated from its creator but made full of His goodness by its miraculously 
unmediated relation to God. Th e relation between God and creation is that of 
the divine creation, in which God makes the world to be just as he wills it to 
be: a paradox not adequately described by ordinary, fi nite relational or cate-
gorical terms. Contact with the eternal may be sought through created things 
because God wills this to be the case. Eriugena, on the other hand, held that 
divine unity, located in eternity, must be completely identical to the created 
world and the created world to it, so that the relation, if critically examined, is 
“identity” as a powerful logical operator rather than the theological notion of 
divine power creating all things. Th e created must share or be God’s eternity, 
and this proves to unleash the contradictions of propositional binary logic.
41. Anagogy was the fourth and highest of the “four senses” of exegesis, as described 
by Henri de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale: les quatre sens de l’Écriture (Paris: Aubier, 
1961–1964).
42. Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelft h Century: Th e Literary In-
fl uence of the School of Chartres (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 4–17.
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Under Eriugena’s neo-Platonic view and anagogical method, the created 
world is part of the eternal but so degraded that it gives one little reason 
to attend to it. Under Nyssa’s analogical, Genesis-consistent approach, the 
created world stands on its own, as if this too were a gift  of the divine cre-
ative miracle and is not a weak form of eternity but a full complement and 
contrast to it, worthy of attention. If all is One, nothing matters; but if the 
eternal is a domain of what is to us miraculous, it can bless every bit of dust 
and ash.
An important example of how concepts of eternity aff ected parts of the 
medieval understanding of the material representation of the divine is that of 
the veneration of relics.43 Bodily and contact relics lie among time past, time 
present, and eternity. Broadly, a relic is sacred by virtue of the impression 
upon it or the trace of the divine goodness and truth; most systems of belief 
in the supernatural, newer as well as axial or even older, have had numi-
nous objects, some of which were acheiropoietic (i.e., not made by human 
hands). Such things stand in the gap between Heaven and earth or are a type 
of communicator from the divine to the human (and back) to which printed 
text and imagery readily seem to be akin. Most of the philosophical contests 
over the one and the many and the participation of the real in the ideal ap-
pear explicitly or implicitly in the histories of communication, the growth of 
knowledge, and concepts of time and progress. Cults of saints’ relics, aft er 
having been greatly stimulated by Crusader loot, seem to have spread and 
increased in intensity in the later Middle Ages. While recognizing the com-
mercial reality of relics, we must also see that the very possibility of the in-
tellectual validity of veneration of relics rested on one or another theory of 
what eternity is and the nature or degree of divine immanence.44
In the rhetoric of canon law—as developed late in the Middle Ages—a 
relic was both res sacra (a thing consecrated by a pontifex) and res spiritua-
lis (a spiritual annexum to ordinary things).45 Th e real part of relics was not 
43. On the “confl ation” or “blurring” of image and relic in the late medieval develop-
ment of new media, see David S. Areford, “Multiplying the Sacred: Th e Fift eenth-Century 
Woodcut as Reproduction, Surrogate, Simulation,” in Th e Woodcut in Fift eenth-Century 
Europe, ed. Peter Parshall (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press for the National Gal-
lery of Art, 2009), 119–154.
44. On relics as vestiges or traces, see Anthony Cutler, “Th e Relics of Scholarship: On 
the Production, Reproduction, and the Interpretation of Hallowed Remains in Late An-
tiquity, Byzantium, Early Islam, and the Medieval West,” in Saints and Sacred Matter: Th e 
Cult of Relics in Byzantium and Beyond, ed. Cynthia Hahn and Holger A. Klein (Washing-
ton, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2016), 309–346.
45. Stéphane Borion, “Défi nition et statut juridique des reliques dans le droit cano-
nique classique” [Defi nition and legal status of relics in classical canon law], in Reliques 
et sainteté dans l’espace médiéval, ed. Jean-Luc Deuffi  c (Saint-Denis: Pecia, 2006), 23–
29. Th is text is the only source I have found that summarizes canon law on relics as a 
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their material substance.46 Christianity developed a body of thought that in-
corporated, but also endeavored to supersede, the ancient puzzles of the one 
and the many in its vision of a constant God. Relics had to be fi tted into this 
frame, though they also busted it. Strong argument was required in order to 
square the temporality of the relics of fi nite bodies with the temporality of 
eternity in which Christianity requires the devout to conceive God.
As early as the early fi ft h century, just aft er Gregory’s passing, we can see 
the eff ect of diff erentiation between a pure, purged temporality of eternity 
and our busy, interval-soaked temporality in thinking about relics. Whereas 
the ideas of Gregory and the other Cappadocian Fathers supported vener-
ation of relics in Eastern Christianity, the matter was controverted in Gaul 
and elsewhere in the Latin world.47 Th e issue arises in a polemic on relics in 
response to St. Ambrose’s provisioning of churches with relics.48 Vigilantius 
of Calagurris (fl . 395–406 CE) argued, against St. Paulinus and even against 
St. Jerome,49 the eternal is too distant from us to make sense of paying it trib-
ute through veneration and other ascetic practices.50 Th e purity of life with 
God is not for such as we, who can be fat and happy in the mundane way 
but not in the celestial way.51 Saints’ souls, being what they are, are happy 
with God and do not linger in any earthly substance.52 But for Victricius of 
Rouen (d. not later than 409 CE), his opponent, this position means that 
a protocol of ontological divisions limits God’s scope of creative activity.53 
stable, “classic” formula. Nicole Hermann-Mascard, Les Reliques des Saints: Formation 
coutumière d’un droit [Th e relics of the saints: Customary formation of a right] (Paris: 
Klinksieck, 1975) discusses the historical development of this formula.
46. Hermann-Mascard, Les Reliques, 42–45.
47. Th e Cappadocian Fathers include Basil the Great (330–379 CE) and Gregory Na-
zianzus (329–389 CE) with Gregory of Nyssa and helped reconcile Greek philosophy 
with early Christian theology.
48. An earlier debate on veneration of the bodies of saints is described in Jean-Marie 
Sansterre, “Les justifi cation du culte des reliques dans le haut Moyen Age” [Th e justifi ca-
tion of the cult of relics in the late Middle Ages], in Les reliques: objets, cultes, symboles, ed. 
Edna Bozóky and Anne-Marie Helvétius (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), 81–94.
49. Jerome argued Nyssa’s side against Eunomius as well as Victricius’s against Vigilantius 
in Adversus Vigilantium, ed. Jean Louis Feiertag (Opera III.5) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 
sec 8 (18–20). Vigilantius’s work is lost.
50. David G. Hunter, “Vigilantius of Calagurris and Victricius of Rouen: Ascetics, Rel-
ics, and Clerics in Late Roman Gaul,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 7, no. 3 (1999): 
Hunter 401–430, here 429, doi:10.1353/earl.1999.0061.
51. Hunter, “Vigilantius,” 430.
52. Ibid., 424–427.
53. De laude Sanctorum, ed. I. Mulders and R. Demeulenaere, in Corpus Christiano-
rum Series Latina LXIV (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 69–93; English translation with full 
apparatus by Gilian Clark, “Victricius of Rouen: Praising the Saints,” Journal of Early 
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God’s perfection transcends all ontological or procedural limits on justice,54 
and most certainly He has no need of emanations or intervals.55 God, lacking 
all division, which Victricius expresses as “quantity and quality,” outside a 
contingency, can fi nish all he makes; and the relics of the saints he makes so 
as to lack nothing.56 Th e physical relics are species of which the incorruptible 
God is the genus.57 A thoughtful devout person must struggle to work out in 
words the way in which relics partake of unlimited eternal being, so diffi  cult 
to state that Victricius warns us that we must beware of “the deceitful snares 
of speech.”58
As to direct theorizing of relics, we have only Th iofrid of Echternach’s 
Flores epytaphii sanctorum, composed between 1102 and October 1105 CE,59 
the only medieval treatise devoted to a systematic deliberation about rel-
ics.60 Th e Flores is the only text in the whole of the Middle Ages in which 
we observe an active venerator thinking abstractly and at length about the 
doubled, fraught temporality of relics that could satisfy religious desire for 
connection to the eternal.61 Insofar as Th iofrid does have a logical or philo-
sophical solution to this, it lies in the verb transfundere (to pour, pour out, 
pour off , deposit, discharge, transfuse62) by which he names the link from 
Christian Studies 7, no. 3 (1999): 365–399, doi:10.1353/earl.1999.0071; and a subsequent 
English translation by Philippe Buc, in Medieval Hagiography, ed. Th omas Head (New 
York: Routledge, 2001), 31–52.
54. Victricius, De laude, 8.5 (Mulder and Demeulenaere, 81–82; Clark, 386–388).
55. Ibid., 8.15–16 (Clark, 388), “in reliquis nihil esse non plenum.”
56. Ibid., 9.30–31.
57. Ibid., 10.7–9.
58. Ibid., 10.6–7
59. Th iofr idi Abbatis Epternacensis Flores Epytaphii Sanctorvm, ed. Michele Camillo 
Ferrari Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaeualis series, vol. 133 (Turnhout: Bre-
pols, 1996).
60. Cynthia Hahn notes the singularity of Th iofrid’s treatise in “What Do Reliquaries 
Do for Relics?” Numen 57, no. 3/4 (2010): 284–316, 294. Th e only attempt I know to ex-
plain the curious uniqueness of this work in the medieval corpus is Mehdi Dallali, “Débat 
inexistant ou paroles persistantes: la théologie des reliques au Moyen Âge, autour du De 
pigneribus sanctorum de Guibert de Nogent” [Nonexistent debate or persistent words: 
Th e theology of relics in the Middle Ages, around De pigneribus sanctorum by Guibert de 
Nogent] (MA thesis, University of Montréal, 2010), 32–63.
61. Th e best-known medieval work on the subject of relics in Guibert of Nogent’s De 
sanctis et eorum pigneribus, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Me-
diaeualis series, vol. CXXVII (Turnhout: Brepols, 1993). But not very much of it is actu-
ally about relics.
62. See Lewis and Short. Malo, Reading and Writing, 55, defi nes transfundere as “trans-
ference” and relates it to the twin uses of translatio as the relocation of relocation and as a 
metaphorical function. Christopher A. Jones, “Old English Words for Relics of the Saints,” 
Florilegium 26 (1989): 89n22, suggests the translation of Th iofrid’s word as “fusion.”
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God to His creation.63 He uses forms of this verb fourteen times.64 Th e eter-
nal is transfused into the temporal; this infusion makes a bodily relic holy 
when God sanctifi es it. Th iofrid means it to describe God’s way of mixing 
eternality into the created world, but the word is of course a metaphor.65 For 
Th iofrid, the variety of nature shimmers with a unity that is the mystery of 
divine creation, beyond the dialectics of similarity and dissimilarity; and the 
plain facts that we take in through specular cognition, directly and potently 
present to us, in the full colorfulness of worldly things, such mysteries as that 
of God’s use of his unlimited power to endow relics with sacrality.66
Th us for Th iofrid, on the whole, eternity may be sought through created 
things because God wills this to be the case: this is the argument from ana-
logical real presence. God can be present in every corner of creation in ways 
wholly heedless of the rebarbative demands of logic. If, on the other hand, 
the created must share or be God’s eternity, for Eriugena, it is necessary to 
unleash the contradictions of propositional binary logic: this is the argument 
from anagogical symbolic meaning. As Th iofrid was more a rhetorician of 
devotion than he was a philosopher, he uses transfundere to lean sometimes 
toward the dualism of Gregory (whom he quotes) and sometimes toward 
a neo-Platonic monism of the kind we see in Eriugena; and in maintaining 
both approaches through his ambiguous transfusio, he continues the unre-
solved stance taken by Augustine, the dominant fi gure before Th omas Aqui-
nas and Scholasticism. But the diff erence between analogy and anagogy as 
ways of creating meaning was to be highly consequential, as indeed it already 
had been in the Eucharistic Controversy of the eleventh century.67
Th e issue of divine immanence in these discussions of relics helps to 
reveal the confl ict of ontologies leading to diff ering versions of Christian 
neo-Platonism. Th ese ontologies were non-materialist monism and various 
sorts of dualism, which were heretical, and quasi-dualism; and, partly from 
their confl ict, a third ontology arose that in time led away from Platonism 
altogether, the materialist monism familiar to modernity. Here I want to ad-
63. Ferrari, “Einleitung” [Introduction], in Th iofrid, Flores, xlvii–xlix. As he notes (n.s 
146–147), Th iofrid also uses “transtulit” and “transmittit.”
64. E.g., ibid., I.6.17, III.2.5, III.3.21, III.3.44, IV.1.35, IV.2.29, and IV.4.24.
65. For example, at ibid., II.3.36–45, he uses “transfusa” as part of a comparison of 
earthly tribulation to divine glorifi cation.
66. Ibid., II.1.48–63.
67. In this controversy—one phase of the very long debate in Christianity as to the na-
ture of the sacraments—the issue was whether the Eucharist was a symbol that must be 
interpreted by the intellect or a reality that simply was and could be directly known. See 
Brian Stock, Th e Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation 
in the Eleventh and Twelft h Centuries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 
259–272.
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dress a diff erent part of this story: the way in which a quasi-dualism, or at 
least an odd idealistic monism, arising from philosophizing about eternity in 
the period fostered the possibility of technology to reproduce information.
Th e central story of Christianity is, of course, the entry of the divine 
from eternity into humankind in time and history. Th e Veil of Veronica and 
the mandylions and shrouds of early Christianity continued the great theme, 
as did relics and even reliquaries, boxes, and frames. A guarantee of authen-
ticity by impress is a very ancient idea, rooted in metaphors of incision.68 
It was developed in the Middle Ages by the broadening use of seals and all 
kinds of stamping, molding, and casting, including the baking of the Eucha-
rist, in which the true original is transferred by contact onto receptive ma-
trices.69 From about 1375 on, the woodcut, both on single leaves and as text 
illustration, quickly followed by engraving on metal, served devotional cults 
by mediating relic and person—as saints mediate God and humans, as reli-
quaries mediate relic and venerator—picking up the sanctity and truth from 
the eternal object. Th e argument that the impress of ink from an engraved 
original onto a paper substrate transferred the eternal immaterial to tem-
poral matter, divine being thus guaranteeing the truth and the moral value 
of the impression, was fi rst presented, as far as I know, as a theory of early 
woodcuts and engravings by Charles Talbot in 1986, and others have fol-
lowed him in this.70
Talbot, however, specifi cally denies that people of the period in ques-
tion would have thought of typography through the same conceptions as 
those that he argues supported interest in prints of images.71 Yet letterforms 
were sometimes cast from molds at least as early as the twelft h century, and 
words appear in molds from Roman antiquity onward.72 It seems a small step 
68. An interesting recent contribution to the long study of this matter is David Ganz, 
“‘Character’ and the Power of the Letter,” in Graphic Devices and the Early Decorated 
Book, ed. Micelle P. Brown, Ildar H. Garipzanov, and Benjamin C. Tilghman (Wood-
bridge, UK: Boydell, 2017), 31–44.
69. See Aden Kumler’s explorations of this in “Th e ‘Genealogy of Jean le Blanc’: Ac-
counting for the Materiality of the Medieval Eucharist,” in Th e Matter of Art: Materials, 
Practices, Cultural Logics, c. 1250–1750, ed. Christy Anderson, Anne Dunlop, and Pamela 
H. Smith (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 119–140; and “Th e Multi-
plication of the Species: Eucharistic Morphology in the Middle Ages,” Res: Anthropology 
and Aesthetics 59–60 (2011): 179–191, doi:10.1086/RESvn1ms23647789.
70. Charles Talbot, “Prints and the Defi nitive Image,” in Print and Culture in the Renais-
sance, ed. Gerald P. Tyson and Sylvia S. Wagonheim (Newark: University of Delaware 
Press, 1982), 189–207, especially 193–201.
71. Talbot, “Prints,” 189–191.
72. For some examples of medieval cast metal letterforms, see Geoff  Egan and Fran-
ces Pritchard, Dress Accessories c. 1150–c. 1450 (London: Boydell, 1997), 202–203; and 
Annemarieke Willemsen et al., “Late Medieval Bling-Bling: A Collection of Decorated 
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from this to observing that printed text was also thought to retain the truth 
of the original. If this is the case, the wider group of concepts verifying the 
authenticity of an object or image—extending to concepts that expressed 
the ways authority related to truth and goodness in human actions as well as 
productions—is part of the answer to the question Adrian Johns says has not 
yet been asked: what is the origin of the veracity ascribed to early printed 
texts?73 Furthermore, what ideas started to allow for or accompany the re-
placement of manual copying by mechanical copying? What in intellectual 
tensions built and then broke through in the time of the invention of tech-
niques for the mechanical production of multiples?
In medieval Christian thought, the relation of the eternal God to moral 
humankind is the central concern. I hold that the two strains of Christian 
Platonism I have discussed—real presence as understood by analogy and im-
manent presence as understood by anagogy—both, complexly intertwined, 
helped to foster the deployment of replicative media. For example, the infl u-
ence of Plotinian, anagogical monism on the interest in print culture from 
1450 or so onward, through Nicolas of Cusa and Italian intellectuals, has 
been much discussed.74 A common progressivist view associates interest in 
the natural and material world with new media ca. 1400–1450 as parts of 
an increasing tendency toward materialist monism that ultimately overtook 
belief in the supernatural. Although emanationist views, which were mys-
tical and hyper-rationalized at the same time (in the manner of Plotinus), 
continued to shape conception and technology, William of Ockham’s sep-
aration of mundane time from eternity by the direct-miracle path of divine 
creation boosted the conceptual possibilities for attention to the material 
world through his incipient dualism, rather than through Th omistic Aristo-
telianism, naturalism, or idealism, though Ockham nevertheless relied on 
mysteries unintelligible to us to explain the relation of God to the created 
universe.
Leather and Base-metal Mounts in the National Museum of Antiquities in Leiden,” in 
Medieval Material Culture: Studies in Honour of Jan Th ijssen, ed. H. Clevis (Zwolle: Foun-
dation for the Promotion of Archaeology, 2009), 57, 62–65. Letterforms are also part of 
some pilgrimage badges.
73. Adrian Johns, Th e Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 2–3.
74. For example, Karin Emmrich, “St. Viktor bei Mainz, Nikolaus von Kues und der 
frühe Buchdruck: Klerikerkarrieren im Umfeld Johannes Gutenbergs” [St. Viktor near 
Mainz, Nikolaus von Kues and early letterpress: Clerical careers in the area of Johannes 
Gutenberg], in Gutenberg Jahrbuch 76 (2001): 87–93; and Kai-Michael Sprenger, “‘Volu-
mus tamen, quod expressio fi at ante fi nem mensis Maii presentis’: Solite Gutenberg 1452 
im Auft rag Nikolaus von Kues’ Ablsbriefe drucken?” [‘We wish, however, that the ex-
pression of it is made before the end of the month of May’: Solite Gutenberg 1452 on be-
half of Nikolaus von Kues’ letters of indulgence], in Gutenberg Jahrbuch 74 (1999): 42–57.
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Around 1370, Nicholas Oresme discovered that each planetary orbit 
diff ered from every other. No longer could the heavens be understood as an 
exact image of eternal self-identity, expressed in stable arithmetic relation-
ships.75 Since the calendar and time-keeping are ordered by the cosmos, the 
order of time now could seem not to represent eternity as a faithful and exact 
intermediate sphere. Somewhere around 1300 to 1350, the fi rst verge and fo-
liot escapement mechanism for clocks seems to have been invented.76 For-
merly, an educated Christian could feel entirely justifi ed in apprehending the 
eternal as disclosed in the sky, as if through the clouds rent apart by the spec-
tacular machinery of a liturgical play in front of a church. Th e temporal order 
could now be understood as more manipulable and free than hitherto was 
conceivable, but the price was that it might no longer completely conform to 
the ultimate logical order of the universe. In a sense, this was the principle of 
nominalism: things do need not conform to our words about what they do.
Neo-Platonism had a tendency to understand causality in such a way as 
to place the cosmos in a non-diachronic stasis.77 Th e fact of change pushed 
Proclus to place existence in time (opposed to existence in eternity) into 
the enduring and the dated.78 Th is created a “third man,” the durable tem-
porality between Heaven and earth, called the aevum.79 In the emanationist 
scheme of things, such as Eriugena’s, reality is a “continuous series of causes 
and eff ects in which each term is related dynamically to the previous one; it 
‘remains’ in its prior (manifests an element of identity with it), it ‘proceeds’ 
(manifests an element of diff erence), and it ‘reverts’ (strives to re-establish 
the identity).”80 Th is involves a realist ontology of exactly the kind Ockham’s 
nominalism opposes.
His argument begins with the principle that quantity and quality are 
modes of things but are not themselves things.81 Elsewhere, he holds that 
75. Nicole Oresme, Nicole Oresme and the Kinematics of Circular Motion: Tractatus de 
commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate motuum celi, ed. and trans. Edward Grant 
(Madison, WI: University of Milwaukee Press, 1971), 70, 285.
76. Otto Mayr, Authority, Liberty and Automatic Machinery in Early Modern Europe 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 6, 38.
77. Th is can be seen in Elements of Th eology, trans. and ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1933, reprinted 1992), propositions 25–39 (28–43).
78. Proclus, Elements, propositions 55 (52–54) and 105–107 (94–97).
79. See Carlos Steel, “Th e Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time and Eternity and Its Infl u-
ence on Medieval Philosophy,” in Th e Medieval Concept of Time: Studies on the Scholastic 
Dispute and Its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pasquale Porro (Leiden: Brill, 
2001), 3–32.
80. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena, 125; see also 17–26.
81. Guillelmi de Ockham Quaestiones in Librum Secundum Sententiarum, ed. Gedeon 
Gal and Rega Wood (St. Bonaventure, NY: Th e Franciscan Institute, 1981), II. Q. XI, 
241.10–15.
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although we use these modes in all human knowledge, but the requirements 
of their logic do not constrain God’s power as the immediate cause of all ef-
fects. Th ese modes can have no substance other than things themselves, but 
they are concepts and therefore are not things. Th ey are words that can mean 
diff erent things. Aevum expresses a concept for measurement of angelic, that 
is, intermediate, time, but the substances God created must be temporal and 
cannot have any part of the eternal.82 All creation is known by our intellect 
in time.83 All real diff erences among things are diff erences in substances con-
sequent to God’s effi  cient creative power, not in names.84 Th ese diff erences 
can arise from single or multiple causes, but they all branch out through time 
because they were created into and with time rather than through relations, 
essences, or other necessities. Th e reality of things is what God made them, 
not our measurement or organization of them. Our knowledge as cognizing 
subject is tied to the objects of our knowledge by time; the whole complexum 
is within time and not within eternity.85 Eternity excludes measuring and 
being measured, the language of measurement and the logic of measure-
ment.86 While this brings us closer to the angels, it also means that every 
created thing, thus separated from eternity, is subject to the diachronic logic 
of quantity and quality—and, in the longer history of concepts, of cause and 
eff ect.87
In accord with his nominalist logic and seemingly in rough alignment 
with the thinking of Oresme and others and with some engineers and craft s-
men, William of Ockham rejected any temporality between natural time 
and eternity, the aevum. Ockham argued that memory creates the habits 
that comprise our actual, though imperfect, understanding.88 Th is helped to 
move the emanation theory of the cosmos with which Plotinian Christian 
thinkers following Augustine were building theologies into opposition to 
immediate, direct, and intrinsic individuation of beings from being. Individ-
ual and concrete things can be copied and altered, whereas universals are not 
82. Ibid., II. Q. XI, 243.14–19.
83. Ibid., II. Q. XI, 242.21–24.
84. Ibid., II. Q. XI, 245.14–20.
85. Guillelmi de Ockham Quaestiones in librum physicorum Aristotelis, ed. Stephen 
Brown (St. Bonaventure, NY: Th e Franciscan Institute, 1981) Q. XXXIX, 500–501. On 
this see Alessandro Ghisaberti, “Th e Categories of Temporality in William Ockham and 
John Buridan,” in Porro, Th e Medieval Concept of Time, 261–275.
86. Ockham, Quaestiones in librum physicorum, Q. LIV, 542
87. Th e case for crediting a greater infl uence of Ockham in early modernity than is 
customary is made by Charis Charalampous, “William of Ockham’s Mind/Body Dual-
ism and its Transmission to Early Modern Th inkers,” Intellectual History Review 23, no. 4 
(2013): 537–563, doi:10.1080/17496977.2013.796617.
88. Katherine H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Episte-
mology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 131–133.
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and hence are dispensed with by Ockham.89 Vestiges, copies, and images are 
made from our partial knowledge of the likeness of things, rather than from 
our attempts to think like God.90 Aquinas had already stressed the particular-
izing capacity of images, and Ockham and other later Scholastics enhanced 
the distribution of knowledge and also of devotion to individual instances.91 
At the cusp of modernity, one could still conceive of contact with the eter-
nal, but increasingly it was understood as a connection both circumscribed 
by and made as present as possible by the manifold of the world in which we 
live, know, and act.92
Ockham’s distinction of eternity from all measurement is similar to 
Gregory of Nyssa’s separation of eternity from time. Under the infl uence of 
Ockham’s nominalism of which this was a logical part, this suggested that 
what we can fi nd or experience in the world can be validated as truthful or 
good, or their opposites, by investigation of measurable and observable 
properties. Although this is not Descartes’s dualism, both Ockham and Des-
cartes thought the knowledge of the world gave experience of God not, or 
at least not always, as mystical experience but as a study of the world’s own 
peculiar structure. As Ockham conceived it on the basis of his distinction 
between eternity and time, this structure is very highly individuated; it is a 
world of copied individuals in ongoing replication and multiplication, each 
a separate entity but related to other entities through observable, local simi-
larities (along with diff erences), rather than through universal classes or on-
tological extensions of ultimate unity.
In this kind of world, instances of truth and moral goodness are still au-
thorized by their divine source and creator, and we have a world of present 
physical and conceptual detail to scrutinize and learn from. Human work in 
representing ideas of truth and the good through words and images need 
not be conceived by anagogy (though they could, of course, continue to be 
developed or known in this way) but could instead proceed through direct 
89. See J. T. Paasch, “Scotus and Ockham on Universals and Individuation,” in De-
bates in Medieval Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, ed. Jeff rey 
Hause, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 371–394.
90. See Armand Maurer, Th e Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of Its Princi-
ples (Toronto: Pontifi cal Institute of Medieval Studies, 1999), 289, 310, 432–433.
91. Th is is treated by Michelle Karnes, Imagination, Meditation, and Cognition in the 
Middle Ages (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 47–57, 95–97, and in many 
other places.
92. For further discussion of the place of concepts on eternity in early modern thought, 
see Yitzhak Melamed, “Eternity in Early Modern Philosophy,” in Melamed, Eternity, 
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use of our intuitive cognition. Th e human mind by intellectual and physical 
labor could represent or give access to the divine in a way that suits its lim-
ited character, situated and localized as Ockham saw it, in addition to mys-
tical ascent. Confi rming the possibilities of analogical thinking enlarges the 
possibilities of multiplying instances, each of which can develop the original 
or model. A conceptual framework in which individuation is freed of a hi-
erarchy of hypostases can support the desire to expand the development of 
ideas and the technical means to do so.
Th e Ockhamist explanation of eternity and time has two consequences 
(among others) that intricately interplay. Th e fi rst consequence leads to 
thinking of the distance between God and humankind as insuperable due to 
the elimination of ideational and spiritual intermediaries. Th e second conse-
quence provides humans with a direct link to the divine precisely because the 
elimination of an intermediary concept of the cosmos frees up what Ockham 
called “intuitive cognition.” If these two consequences sound contradictory 
to people today, or at least to non-dualists today, the important historical 
point is that for some people in the fourteenth and fi ft eenth centuries they 
did not confl ict and stimulated developments in science and culture. For 
others, changing philosophy, theology, and science caused grievous losses 
in their culture; and, besides such concerns, the publishing trade in partic-
ular cast into oblivion much that it did not put into print. By advancing the 
theoretical possibilities for the making of multiples and replicating machin-
ery, nominalism helped enable the vast collection of information about the 
world that was to put religion to the test. Th e tension between the two ten-
dencies became part of the substance of some of the deepest and hardest 
philosophical problems in succeeding eras.
Radical separation of eternity from temporal succession is just one piece 
of the puzzle. Other important concepts were also changing in the same 
period and contributed to the conceptual possibilities of pre-print. Th ese 
include ideas about memory, of which understanding changed as historical 
studies developed in this period, along with changes in the material means of 
preservation; about natural forces, such as impetus; about human labor, due 
to the many slow steps in its replacement by mechanism; about the concept 
of individuation, by which copying was, in part, understood; and biological 
life, in which regeneration fi lls history with replicated yet diff erent individu-
als. Of course, the connection between intellectuals and the rest of society is 
unclear, variable, and very much near the heart of the theoretical problem of 
intellectual history. In following the specifi c concept of eternity as the realm 
of the creator in its relationship to the realm of the created, we are looking 
at a kind of model of the question of the historical interaction of conception 
and production. If people in medieval societies, through conceptualization 
or through devotion or feeling or practices, thought that they could make 
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contact with the ineff able eternal, despite the great distance and diff erence 
between the divine and sublunary realms, then their understandings as to 
how something eternal makes itself present in the transitory world are at 
least partly connected to the ways in which they thought they could act, 
think, or feel to receive, perceive, or come to know what is true and what is 
good and right from its source and highest authority.
As new means of communication now bring the age of print to a close, 
we ought to approach the invention of print in a way that incorporates our 
sense of the ongoing loss of print culture in order to have a better grasp of 
our losses and gains in these changes from our study of the most similar pre-
vious events in the history of knowledge and communication. If we deepen 
our understanding of the invention of new ways to produce, circulate, store, 
and retrieve ideas at the end of the Middle Ages and in the early Renaissance 
(and of course later), we have a way of observing the history of conceptions 
and of productions in close conspectus—a conspectus that might draw ever 
closer as the speed of the exchange of ideas increases into faster diff usion and 
greater infl uence.
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